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PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS AND ATTORNEYS: NEGLIGENCE AND
THE THIRD PARTY
I. Introduction
The scope of the liability of a public accountant, who negligently performs
services which result in economic damages to third persons not in privity of
contract with the accountant, has generated a great deal of literature1 and litiga-
tion.2 Only recently' have inroads been made on the rule of Ultramares Corp.
v. Touche,4 that third parties not in privity of contract with the accountant
may not recover economic damages caused by the public accountant's negligence.
These inroads are significant in view of the fact that the accounting profession
has in the past been protected, for policy reasons, from what was feared would
be "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an in-
determinate class."5
The same reasons which would lead to an expansion of the accountant's
liability would, in applicable situations, dictate an expansion of the attorney's
third-party liability; a liability, which prior to the recent decisions dealing with
public accountants, had expanded to the point of allowing third parties to
recover economic damages for negligence in limited circumstances.'
This note will analyze the present scope of the accountant's liability to third
I See criticizing Ultramares: Bradley, Auditor's Liability and the Need for Increased
Accounting Uniformity, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 898 (1965); Hawkins, Professional Negli-
gence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1959), article is also printed in
I. RoADY & W. ANDERSEN, PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE at 256-283 (1960); Levitin, Accoun-
tants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 436 (1964);
Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants' Liability To the Public, 18
DE PAUL L. REv. 56 (1968); Note, Accountants" Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial
Statements, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 1437 (1967); Note, The Accountants Liability - For What
and To Whom, 36 IowA L. REv. 319 (1951); Note, Potential Liability of Accountants to Third
Parties for Negligence, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 588 (1967); Comment, Accountant's Liabilities
to Third Parties Under Common Law and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L.
REV. 137 (1967); Comment, Accountant's Liability to Third Parties for Negligence, 23 U.
MIAms L. REv. 256 (1968); Comment, Auditor's Responsibility for Misrepresentation: In-
adequate Protection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WASH. L. REv. 139 (1968).
For a more favorable view of Ultramares see: Katsoris, Accountants Third Party Liability
- How Far Do We Go?, 36 FoRDHA L. REV. 191 (1967); Comment, Torts: Accountant
Liable to Third Party for Negligent Misrepresentation, 53 MINN. L. REv. 1375 (1969);
Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law, 46 WASH.
L. REv. 675 (1971).
2 Cases involving public accountants and third parties are numerous. For decisions within
the last ten years in which the scope of duty owed to third parties was set out see: Security-
First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Lutz, 297 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Investment Cor-
poration of Florida v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968); Blank v. Kaitz, 350
Mass. 779, 216 N.E.2d 110 (1966); Teich v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 40 Misc. 2d 519, 243
N.Y.S.2d 368 (1963, rev'd per curiam, 24 App. Div. 2d 749, 263 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1965).
The most recent decisions in which the scope of the duty has been increased are: Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395
(Iowa 1969); Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. CiV. App.
1971).
3 See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne,
170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873
(Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
4 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
5 Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
6 See Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), csrt.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1968).
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parties, discuss the policy reasons and problems of increasing the accountant's
liability to the full extent of foreseeability, compare the accountant's scope of
liability to that of the attorney, and discuss the impact on the legal profession of
the extension of the public accountant's liability to the full limits of foresecability,
an extension which would necessitate that Ultramares" be overruled.
II. Privity of Contract-Evolution and Erosion
When a public accountant or attorney is retained to perform services, he
does so pursuant to a contract of employment. The contractual relationship
imposes certain obligations on the attorney or accountant, one of which is a duty
to exercise reasonable care in accordance with the standards of his profession in
performing the contract.' When the accountant or attorney fails to exercise the
degree of care required, he may be liable to his client for breach of contract or
in tort law for negligence in the performance of the contract.'
The liability for negligence of a contracting party to a third person with
whom he has not made a contract has a long history filled with certain obstacles.
One of these obstacles is the fact that there has been no direct transaction between
the plaintiff and defendant-they are not in "privity" of contract. The absence
of "privity" between the parties makes it difficult to base any duty to the plaintiff
upon the contract itself. But by entering into the contract, the law may impose
a duty, sounding in tort and not in contract, upon the contracting party to
exercise reasonable care in the performance of the contract to avoid damages to
third persons not in "privity" of contract. The evolution of this duty to third
parties was slow."
In 1842, the Court of Exchequer in Winterbottom v. Wright" held that the
breach of a contract to keep a mailcoach in repair could not give rise to a cause
of action to a passenger in the coach who was injured when it collapsed. Lord
Abinger, recognizing that there was no privity of contract between the parties,
stated:
7 This note will not cover the accountant's or attorney's liability for fraud or gross negli-
gence, nor will the effects of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 be discussed. It should be noted that the scope of the accountant's and lawyer's third
party liability in these areas of the law can be quite extensive. For a discussion on the Federal
Security Laws see: Note, Accountants' Liabilities for False and Misleading Financial State-
ments, 61 COLUM. L. Rav. 1437 (1967); Comment, Accountants' Liabilities to Third Parties
Under Common Law and Federal Securities Law, 9 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rv. 137 (1967);
Comment, Auditor's Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of
Financial Statements, 44 WAsn. L. REv. 139 (1968). For a discussion on fraud see note 26
infra. Also, it should be noted that significant developments have taken place in the criminal
law affecting public accountants. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970). For an excellent discussion on the criminal liability of
the public accountant and in particular the Simon case see Note, The Criminal Liability of
Public Accountants: A Study of United States v. Simon, 46 NoTaa DAME LAWYER 564 (1971).
8 Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955).
9 Id. See also American Indemnity Co. v. Ernst & Ernst, 106 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937), indicating the importance of the contract or tort alternatives as far as the statute of
limitations is concerned.
10 W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THBE LAW OF TORTS § 93 (4h ed. 1971).
11 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). See also Langride v. Levy, 2 N. & W.
519, 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Ex. 1837).
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Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who
entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which
I can see no limit, would ensue. 12
The words of Lord Abinger were interpreted by subsequent courts to mean that
there could be no action, even in tort, for the negligent performance of a con-
tract injuring a third person not in "privity" of contract."
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, the idea of a general duty, ir-
respective of contract, to avoid unreasonable risks of harm to the person or
property of another had begun to develop in England, as exemplified by Judge
Brett's dictum in Heaven v. Pender." Due to the defendant dock owner's
negligence, the plaintiff ship painter was injured. Addressing himself to the
question of duty, Judge Brett observed:
. . . [Wlhenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position
with regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would
at once recognise that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own
conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of
injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill to avoid such danger.' s
The foundation for the abrogation of the privity doctrine in the United
States was laid in Thomas v. Winchester' decided in 1852. The New York court
held that the vendor who sold mislabeled poison to a druggist, who in turn sold
to a customer, was liable to the customer for injuries caused as a result of his
negligent mislabeling. The court had no problem in finding a duty to avoid
injury where negligence would put human life in imminent danger.
The doctrine of privity was further weakened by Judge Cardozo's opinion in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." in 1916. In holding a car manufacturer liable
to a customer not in privity, Judge Cardozo stated:
If to the element of danger there is added knowledge that the thing will be
used by persons other than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then,
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under
a duty to make it carefully.
We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when
the consequences of negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract
and nothing else. We have the source of the obligation where it ought to be.
We have put its source in the law.' 8
MacPherson is indicative of the erosion of privity in those cases where
negligerice resulted in physical harm to person or property. In the sphere of
12 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
13 The interpretation has been condemned as faulty; nevertheless, a general rule developed
that one not in privity could maintain no action against a contracting party. W. PROSSER,
note 10 -supra.
14 11 Q.B.D. 503, 510 (Ct. App. 1883).
15 Id. at 509.
16 6 N.Y. 397, 58 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
17 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
18 Id. at 389-90, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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tangible, physical damages, the limitations of privity have given way to the more
general duty of reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risks of physical harm.19
The first significant case"0 extending liability for negligence beyond privity
of contract, where only intangible economic damages"1 were involved, was
Glanzer v. Shepard.22 Judge Cardozo, speaking for the Court of Appeals of
New York, rejected the argument that no duty was owed to the plaintiffs because
there was no contract between the plaintiffs and defendant. The plaintiffs,
Glanzer Bros., purchased a quantity of beans. The seller of the beans contracted
with the defendant, a public weigher, to certify the correct weight of the beans.
The defendant knew that the plaintiffs were to use the certificates as the basis for
their payment to the seller. The defendant negligently overstated the weight, and
as a result the plaintiffs overpaid. In allowing the plaintiffs to recover for their
economic damages, Judge Cardozo, holding that there was a duty owed to the
plaintiffs, stated:
We do not need to state the duty in terms of contract or of privity. Growing
out of a contract, it has nonetheless an origin not exclusively contractual.
Given the contract and the relation, the duty is imposed by law.23
Judge Cardozo recognized that the defendant's duty could have been stated
in contract. 24 On the facts-the relationship of the parties and the specific trans-
action-the third-party-beneficiary rule of Lawrence v. Fox25 would have been
applicable. The approach in contract was declined and instead the duty was
stated in tort. Judge Cardozo acknowledged the strong precedent against ex-
pansion of liability in tort, " but refused to follow such precedent, observing that
"the bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge of a prospective use."2" Glanzer
was thought28 to be the beginning of what would develop into a general duty of
reasonable care to avoid all foreseeable risks of economic damages to third
parties not in privity of contract. However, this was not to be.
In 1931, nine years after the decision in Glanzer, Judge Cardozo issued his
opinion in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, " which refused to extend the scope of
liability for economic damages caused by negligence to the full limits of foresee-
ability 0 in favor of a third party not in privity. Viewed either as the strength of
19 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 96 (4th ed. 1971).
20 There had been other extensions beyond the privity rule where abstractors were involved.
However, liability in these instances was achieved by theories of third party beneficiary or
agency rather than by resort to a general duty of care; see Hawkins, supra note 1, at 814 n.77.
21 For definitional purposes, economic damage is monetary loss, i.e., money lost as a result
of investments, loans, purchases, sales or other types of financial transactions. Tangible damage
is physical injury to the person or property of another.
22 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
23 Id. at 276.
24 Id. at 277.
25 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
26 Saving Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). See also Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa. 406,
107 A. 783 (1919).
27 233 N.Y. at 240, 135 N.E. at 276.
28 Note, Privity of Contract and Tort Liability, 21 MICH. L. Rzv. 200 (1922).
29 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). Hereinafter referred to as Ultramares.
30 Foreseeability is generally defined as the "ability to see or know in advance, hence, the
reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is a likely result of acts or omissions." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 777 (4th ed. 1968). In the context of public accounting, a rule of "full
foreseeability" would necessarily embrace all individuals or institutions that the accountant
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the privity doctrine or the narrowing of the scope of duty to avoid economic loss,
the effect of Ultramares was to limit the recovery for negligence causing economic
damages to less than all those people who might foreseeably be injured. In
Ultramares, the defendants, a firm of certified public accountants, were retained
by Fred Stern & Co., Inc., to prepare and certify a balance sheet representing
its financial condition. In performing their audit, the defendants were negligent,
and as a result"' the balance sheet showed a net worth of approximately
$1,070,000 when in fact Fred Stern & Co. was insolvent. The defendants knew
that in the usual course of business the balance sheet, when certified, would be
exhibited by the Stern Company to banks, creditors, stockholders, purchasers, or
sellers, according to the needs of the occasion, as the basis of financial dealings.
The defendants did not know the exact persons to whom the certified balance
sheet would be shown or the extent or number of transactions in which it would
be used, and, most importantly, the accountants did not know that the balance
sheet would be submitted to the plaintiff. Relying upon the balance sheet and
the accompanying certificate of the defendant accountants, the plaintiff loaned
money to Stern. Ten months after the loan, Stern was declared bankrupt. The
plaintiff's cause of action alleged fraud 2 and negligence. The Court of Appeals
of New York affirmed the trial term's dismissal of the first cause of action based on
negligence. On the facts, the defendants were negligent, the only question being
whether the accountants owed a duty to the plaintiff. Judge Cardozo, in ques-
tioning the wisdom of a duty of reasonable care to all who rely on the balance
sheet, observed:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to
detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose
accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business conducted on
these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist
in the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences. 3
knows or should reasonably expect will rely upon the certified financial statements. That is,
it is foreseeable that lending institutions, creditors, stockholders, and other classes of individuals
or institutions will rely upon the accountant's services.
31 The court stated that the evidence supported a finding of negligence in conducting the
audit. The evidence indicated that in certain areas of the audit, the diligence of the auditors
did not meet the professional standards. A false entry was posted to accounts receivable for
approximately $706,000 by one of Stern Co.'s employees. The auditors had notice of the entry
but failed to verify its validity. Apparently, the auditor did not trace the entry to the generaljournal or to any supporting invoices, any of these steps would have alerted the auditor to the
suspicious circumstances surrounding this entry. The accounts receivable and other assets were
overstated with the resultant overstatement of net worth (capital account).
32 The scope of liability for fraud includes those third parties the accountant should have
reasonably foreseen would be injured by his misrepresentation. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v.
Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D. R.I. 1968. In Ultramares, Judge Cardozo, defining the scope
of duty for fraud, stated at 255 N.Y. 179, 174 N.E. 444:
To creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate, the
defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there was notice in the
circumstances of its making that the employer did not intend to keep it to himself.
See also State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E. 2d 416 (1938); Duro Sports-
wear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem., 285 App. Div. 864, 137
N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955). For a more extensive treatment of fraud see generally Levitin, supra
note 1; Solomon, supra note 1; Katsoris, supra note 1; and Hawkins, supra note 1.
33 174 N.E. at 444.
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Judge Cardozo noted that "[tlhe assault upon the citadel of privity is
proceeding in these days apace." 4 He had precedent from his own decision in
Glanzer to continue the "assult," yet he chose not to. Glanzer was not overruled
but merely distinguished. Cardozo stated:
In Glanzer v. Shepard, the seller of beans requested the defendants, public
weighers, to make return of the weight and furnish the buyer with a copy.
... Here was something more than the rendition of a service in the ex-
pectation that the one who ordered the certificate would use it thereafter
in the operations of his business as occasion might require. Here was a case
where the transmission of the certificate to another was not merely one
possibility among many, but the "end and aim of the transaction," . .. In
a word, the service rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was
primarily for the information of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a
party to the contract, and only incidentally for that of the formal promisee.
In the case at hand, the service was primarily for the benefit of the Stern
Company . . . and only incidentally or collaterally for use of those to
whom Stem and his associates might exhibit it thereafter. 5
Judge Cardozo's decision in Ultramares has been criticized as being in-
consistent with his decision in MacPherson."8 In MacPherson, the car manu-
facturer, who put the car on the market, was successfully sued by the third party
who was physically injured as a result of the manufacturer's negligence. In
Ultramares, the accountant placed in the "market" a negligently prepared audit
report. A third party relied upon the report and was denied recovery against the
accountant. The harm was foreseeable in both instances, T7 yet the treatment of
economic damages vis-It-vis physical damages was different. Policy reasons
prompted Judge Cardozo to limit the recovery for economic damages. Judge
Cardozo was concerned with the detrimental effects that liability to the full limits
of foreseeability would have on the accounting profession, " and likewise on the
legal profession. 9 The policy reasons enunciated in Ultramares have been subject
to numerous criticisms.4 ° Nevertheless, the proposition set forth in Ultramares
that the scope of liability for economic loss should be more limited than for
tangible, physical damages remained unscathed until the 1960's. Prior to the
1960's, it appeared that the only way a third party could recover for economic
damages for negligence in the performance of services was to show that services
were rendered "primarily for the benefit of" the third party and that the de-
fendant knew that the particular third party would rely on its services. 1
34 Id. at 445.
35 Id. at 445, 446.
36 For an excellent critique of Ultramares see: Solomon, Ultramares Revisited: A Modern
Study of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 56 (1968); see also Seavey,
Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HAv. L. Rv. 372, 400 (1939).
37 See note 30 supra, for a definition of foreseeability in the context of public accounting.
38 See the text accompanying notes 112 through 115 infra.
39 See the text accompanying note 133 infra.
40 Supra note 1. See also Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. R.I.
1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401 (Iowa 1969).
41 Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922). See International Products
Co. v. Erie R. Co., 244 N.Y. 331, 155 N.E. 662 (1927); United States v. Rogers & Rogers,
161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Robitscher v. United Clay Products Company, 143 A.2d
99 (Mdn. App. D.C. 1958).
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In 1961, in M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist.,42 the
scope of liability for economic damages resulting from negligence was extended
to a plaintiff, who, though not specifically known and identified to the defendant,
was allowed recovery because he was a member of a foreseeable limited class. The
defendant engineering firm negligently prepared a soil report knowing that the
report would be used by prospective bidders in the preparation of their bids and
by the' successful bidder in his work. As a result of his reliance on the report,
the plaintiff suffered a $918,000 loss. The court rejected the defense of lack of
privity of contract and held the defendant liable for negligent misrepresentation.
One year later, in Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga,3 the fed-
eral district court was presented with facts very similar to those in M. Miller Co.
The court rejected any notions of privity and talked in terms of the scope of the
duty. The limitations placed on the extent of duty by Ultramares were con-
demned as not being congruent with the complex industrial, commercial society
that existed in 1962, some thirty years after the Ultramares decision.44 In fashion-
ing a duty, the court stated:
A more reasonable solution to this problem, and one which constitutes
no innovation in the law of negligence, is to hold that a duty is owed to
the class of persons which a given act may foreseeably affect, as distinct from
a plaintiff who is individually foreseeable ...
The Court therefore concludes that, as between the Restatement view on
the one hand, recognizing responsibility to foreseeable classes of persons, and
the Ultramares view on the other, requiring foreseeability as to the specific
plaintiff, the former is more consonant with the legal and practical consider-
ations obtaining in Tennessee today.4 5
The idea.of liability to an unknown plaintiff who is a member of a fore-
seeable class or limited group was solidified in Rozny v. Marnul.46 Rozny is the
first state supreme court decision allowing recovery for economic damages caused
by negligent misrepresentation to an unknown third party not in privity.4" The
Illinois Supreme Court rejected the concept of privity" and in doing so stated:
This process of adhering to or eliminating the privity requirement has
proved to be an unsatisfactory method of establishing the scope of tort
liability to third persons.... [W]e emphasize that lack of direct contractual
relationship between the parties is not a defense in a tort action in this
jurisdiction. Thus, tort liability will henceforth be measured by the scope
of the duty owed rather than the artificial concepts of privity .... Having
discarded any remnants of the privity concept, we now concern ourselves
42 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961).
43 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964). The Sixth
Circuit reversed because it would not "fashion a rule not yet adopted in Tennessee." 329 F.2d
at 407.
44 204 F. Supp. at 833.
45 Id. at 834. The court was referring to Restatement, Torts § 552, for the most recent
tentative draft of § 552, see note 50 infra.
46 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
47 For an extensive treatment of Rozny, see Comment, Pecuniary Liability to Third Parties
for Negligent Misrepresentation, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 903 (1970).
48 Accord, Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
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with the scope of the defendant's liability using traditional tortious mis-
representation standards.4 9
The case involved a surveyor who negligently prepared a plat which
eventually resulted in damages to the plaintiff who had become owner of the
property. The court aligned its thinking with the tentative Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 552 (Tent. Draft, No. 12, 1966)," ° recognizing that the
draft extends liability to a "nebulous group whose reliance on the survey was
something more than foreseeable but something less than identifiably known. 51
Having discarded the concept of privity as artificial,52 the courts have focused
on the scope of the duty owed. At this point of the development of the law, it
appears that professionals such as attorneys and public accountants owe a duty
of due care to those third parties who are known or who, though unknown, are
members of a foreseeable limited class or group that will rely on the services
performed."3
However, the durability of Utramares as a limitation on recovery for eco-
nomic damages is questionable. In a recent line of decisions involving public
accountants, 4 there are indications that recovery to the full extent of foreseeability
may be allowed. Such an extension of liability would necessarily involve the over-
rule55 of Ultramares and accordingly would increase the legal responsibility of
other professions, in addition to public accounting, in those situations involving
recovery for economic damages."8
In examining the recent decisions involving the accounting profession, there
49 43 Ill. 2d at 62, 250 N.E.2d at 660.
50 The proposed Restatement of Torts § 552 .tates the law, at p. 14, as follows:
(I) One who, in the course of his business profession or employment, or in a
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for 'pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care of competence in obtaining or communicating the in-
formation.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he
intends to supply the information, or knows that the recipient intends
to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction which he intends the in-
formation to influence, or knows that the recipient so intends, or in a
substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information
extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is
created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
For illustrations posed by the draftsmen pertaining to public accountants see note 80 infra.
51 43 Il. 2d at 67, 250 N.E.2d at 663.
52 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 IIl. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d
583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Biakanja v.
Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E.
275 (1922).
53 Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969). See
note 80 infra.
54 Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971). These decisions are discussed in the text accompanying notes 70 through 94.
55 See the text beginning at note 1I1 infra for a discussion of the overrule or retention of
Ultramares and the policy arguments involved.
56 See text accompanying notes 133-37 infra.
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can be discerned a judicial attitude indicating the eventual expansion of the
scope of liability to the point where actions solely for economic damages caused
by the negligence of an attorney or accountant will be treated the same as actions
for tangible damages caused by negligence. However, no court has yet taken af-
firmative steps to overrule Ultramares. Ultramares, though weakened, is still
solid law. 7
III. Development of Public Accountant's Liability
to Third Parties for Negligence
The history" of suits against public accountants by third parties can be
traced back to 1919. The court in Landell v. Lybrand,59 denied the plaintiff
investor's action for negligence, holding that the alleged negligence of the defend-
ant accountant was not supported by a duty owed to the plaintiff. Relying upon
the accountant's report, the plaintiff purchased stock in a company. Due to the
alleged negligence of the accountants, the financial statements were false and the
stock was valueless. The court declared that a duty would be owed to the plain-
tiff only if there was a contractual relationship between the parties or if fraud
was proven. In the absence of such allegations, there could be no liability. This
was nothing more than the general rule of Winterbottom0 being resounded.
Two years later Glanzer 1 was decided. At this point, it appeared by anal-
ogy that an accountant who had negligently performed his audit, in circum-
stances where he could foresee that it would be relied upon by third persons,
would be liable notwithstanding the Landell decision. However, Ultramares62
soon set the limits. Judge Cardozo did not overrule, but merely distinguished
Glanzer. However, the distinction made in Ultramares was not taken up by the
courts,6" instead they accepted Ultramares as holding that accountants owe no
duty to persons not in privity.64 This interpretation has been applied in cases
factually similar to Glanzer-a negligent misrepresentation relied upon by a
known third party for a specific transaction."
In 1968, the Florida Appellate Court, in Investment Corporation of Florida
57 Stephens Industries, Inc. v. Haskins and Sells, 438 F.2d 357, 359-60 (10th Cir. 1971).
58 For a historical treatment of the public accountant's liability see: Levitin, Accountants'
Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 436 (1964); Hawkins,
Professional Negligence Liability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. Rav. 797 (1959).
59 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919).
60 See note 11 supra, 152 Eng. Rep. 402. It should be noted that by 1919, there had
developed certain exceptions to the rule of Winterbottom In the realm of physical damages
see Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In the realm of economic damages, proof
of fraud was an exception to the rule of privity of contract.
61 See Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
62 Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
63 Hawkins, supra note 58, at 815; Levitin, supra note 58, at 447.
64 See generally O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937); State Street Trust Co.
v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d
20 (Supr. Ct. 1954), aff'd without opinion, 285 App. Div. 864, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955);
C.I.T. Financial Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1955).
65 Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164; for a criticism of the Candler
decision see Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. - Negligent Misrepresentation by Ac-
countants, 67 L.Q. Rnv. 466 (1951).
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v. Buchman,"' was faced with facts that fit within the Glanzer mold.67  The
plaintiff had desired to purchase a large block of stock in the Belcher-Young
Company. The purchase was conditioned on a favorable certified financial state-
ment. .The defendant accountants were retained by Belcher-Young. The ac-
countants knew that the plaintiffs would rely on the certified financial statements
in making their decision to buy the stock or rescind the contract. The plaintiffs
purchased the stock and within a year the Belcher-Young corporation failed finan-
cially. The plaintiff alleged that the "defendants owed a duty of care to known
third parties."68 The court held that the defendant accountants were not liable
to known third parties for negligence in the preparation of a certified financial
statement. The Florida Appellate Court recognized that there were policy argu-
ments in favor of both parties, but declined to break from precedent.69
Two months later, the Rhode Island Federal District Court, in Rusch Fac-
tors, Inc. v. Levin, "0 was confronted with a defendant accountant's assertion of
lack of privity as a complete defense to a similar negligence charge. The plain-
tiff, a New York commercial banking and factoring corporation, had loaned
money to a Rhode Island corporation on the strength of financial statements
certified by the defendant accountant. The Rhode Island corporation subse-
quently went into receivership and the plaintiff brought an action for damages
resulting from the defendant's negligent misrepresentations in the financial state-
ments.71 In denying the defendant accountant's motion to dismiss, the court
stated that ". . . an accountant should be liable in negligence for careless finan-
cial misrepresentations relied upon by actually foreseen and limited classes of per-
sons.
' 72
The court, in formulating the rationale for its decision, observed:
The reluctance of the courts to hold the accounting profession to an obliga-
tion of care which extends to all reasonably foreseeable reliant parties is pre-
dicated upon the social utility rationale first articulated by Judge Cardozo in
the Ultramares case ....
The wisdom of the decision in Ultramares has been doubted . . . and
this Court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant party be forced
to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional malpractice?
Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it
on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the
risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire con-
suming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cau-
66 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).
67 For a discussion of the case see Note, Accountant's Liability to Third Parties for Negli-
gence, 23 U. MrAmi L. REV. 256 (1968).
68 See 208 So. 2d 291 292.
69 The precedent followed was Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guaranty Co., 142
Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940), which held that an abstractor is not liable to persons with whom
there is no privity of contract. The court also followed State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278
N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938), which interpreted Ultramares as meaning an accountant
could not be liable for ordinary negligence in the absence of a contractual relationship.
70 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
71 The plaintiff also alleged fraud, and the court in a rather summary fashion stated that
the plaintiff's complaint was sufficient insofar as it alleged fraud. However, almost the entire
opinion was directed toward the allegation of negligence and the question of privity. See 284
F. Supp. at 90.
72 Id. at 92-93.
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tionary techniques of the accounting profession? For these reasons it ap-
pears to this Court that the decision in Ultramares constitutes an unwar-
ranted inroad upon the principle that "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived
defines the duty to be obeyed.1
73
The factual context in which the preceding statements were made is signifi-
cant. The criticism of Ultramares and the citation of Palsgraf were not made in
a case dealing with an engineer," a surveyor,"5 or other professional where the
potential for liability is not as great as that of an accountant. Rather, the state-
ments were made in a case involving a public accountant, the profession which
was the focal point in Ultramares. The court, for the reasons enunciated, chal-
lenged the policy considerations which prompted Judge Cardozo's decision. In
denying the defendant accountant's motion to dismiss, the court left open "for
reconsideration in the light of trial development, the question of whether an




Rusch Factors, Inc. is significant for what it held and what it said.7 7 It is
the first American or English decision to hold an accountant liable for negligent
misrepresentation to a reliant party not in privity."8 The court criticized the
decision in Investment Corporation of Florida as "wrong in so far as it failed
either to perceive or to give weight to the distinction between Ultramares and
Glanzer." 9 The court in Rusch Factors, Inc. not only extends the accountant's
liability for negligence as far as Glanzer, but goes further and extends such lia-
bility to a limited foreseeable class."0 The language in Rusch Factors, Inc. has
73 Id. at 90-91.
74 M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1961); Texas Tunneling Company v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn., 204 F. Supp.
821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964).
75 Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
76 284 F. Supp. at 93. The question was never answered because the case was settled
by the accountant's insurance company before the trial development began.
77 Because of the few facts provided in the opinion there is room for difference of opinion
as to which is the holding and which is the dicta. However, the overriding intent of the court
is clear - expanded liability in regard to rights of third parties.
78 284 F. Supp. at 90.
79 Id. at 92.
80 The court stated that an accountant should be liable to "actually foreseen and limited
classes of persons." See text accompanying note 72 supra. The court's terminology will no
doubt cause confusion in interpretation and application. The intention of the court may be
deciphered by looking at the illustrations included with § 552 of the tentative draft, one of
which the Rusch Factors court used. 284 F. Supp. at 92. The text of the draft may be
found at note 50 supra. The illustrations pertaining to public accountants are:
... 2. A is negotiating with the X Bank for a credit of $50,000. The Bank re-
quires an audit by certified public accountants. A employs B & Company, a firm of
accountants, to make the audit, telling them that it is to meet the requirements of
the X Bank. B & Company agree to make the audit, with the express understanding
that it is for transmission to X Bank only. The X Bank fails, and A without any
further communication with B & Company submits their certification to the Y Bank,
which in reliance upon it extends a credit of $50,000 to A. The audit is so care-
lessly made as areatly to overstate the financial resources of A, and in consequence
the Y Bank suffers pecuniary loss through its extension of credit. B & Company is
not liable to Y Bank.
3. The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that nothing is said about supply-
ing the information for the guidance of X Bank only, A merely informs B that he
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been criticized as unclear."1 However, the following factors:
1. the Court's rejection of the Ultramares rationale, 2
2. the use of the Palsgraf language,"
3. the favorable citation of the tentative Restatement § 552,"4 and
4. the reservation to trial of the question of extension of
liability to the full limits of foreseeability 5
indicate an intention by the court of an extensive scope of liability if not to the
full limits of foreseeability."
In 1969, the Iowa Supreme Court, in deciding Ryan v. Kanne8 followed
the rationale of Rusch Factors, Inc. In an action brought by the accountant
against his client and the successor corporation of the client, the successor
corporation counterclaimed for damages caused by the negligent misrepresenta-
tions of the accountant in the preparation of the financial statements. The ac-
countants asserted lack of privity and accordingly no liability under the Ultra-
mares rule. The court rejected the "strict rule"88 of Ultramares and denied the
accountant's assertion. In embracing the analysis of Rusch Factors, Inc., the
court observed:
The court there felt a refusal to allow recovery to those so situated would
constitute an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that the risk rea-
sonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed. We agree. When
the accountant is aware that the balance sheet to be prepared is to be used
by a certain party or parties who will rely thereon in extending credit or in
assuming liability for obligations of the party audited, the lack of privity
should be no valid defense to a claim for damages due to the accountant's
negligence. We know of no good reason why accountants should not ac-
cept the legal responsibility to known third parties who reasonably rely upon
financial statements prepared and submitted by them.8 9
expects to negotiate a bank loan, and has the X Bank in mind. B & Company is
subject to liability to Y Bank.
4. The same facts as in Illustration 2, except that A informs B that he expects
to negotiate a bank loan, but does not mention the name of any bank. B & Company
is subject to liability to Y Bank ....
7. A, a certified public accountant, is employed by B Company to prepare and
certify a balance sheet for the corporation. A is not informed of any intended use
of the balance sheet, but A knows that such certificates are customarily used in a
wide variety of financial transactions with the corporation, and that it may be relied
upon by lenders, investors, shareholders, creditors, purchasers, and the like, in nu-
merous possible kinds of transactions. In fact, B Company uses the certified balance
sheet to obtain a loan from X Bank. Because of A's negligence the balance sheet
presents an inaccurate picture of the finances of B Company, and through reliance
upon it X Bank suffers pecuniary loss. A is not liable to X Bank. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, illustrations 2, 3, 4, and 7 at 24-25 (Tent. Draft No.
12, 1966).
81 Comment, Accountant Liable to Third Party for Negligent Misrepresentation, 53 MINN.
L. REV. 1375 (1969).
82 284 F. Supp. at 90-91.
83 Id. at 91.
84 Id. at 91-92.
85 Id. at 93.
86 For discussion of the various interpretations of Rusch Factors see Comment, Account-
ant Liable to Third Party for Negligent Misrepresentation, 53 MINN. L. Rav. 1375, 1383
(1969).
87 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
88 Id. at 401.
89 Id. at 401.
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The Ryan court found it unnecessary at that time to determine whether the
rule of no liability should be relaxed to extend to all foreseeable persons who may
rely upon the report. Rather, the rule was relaxed as to those persons actually
known to the "author" as prospective users of the report, taking into considera-
tion the end and aim of the transaction. 0 On the facts, the Iowa Supreme Court
has gone no farther than Glanzer.91 However, there can be discerned from Ryan
a judicial attitude9 2 of doubt as to the wisdom of the social utility rationale93 of
Ultramares. Whether this "doubt" will extend so far so as to overrule Ultramares
is a question yet to be answered.
It appears at present that the scope of the public accountant's liability for
negligent misrepresentations has extended not only as far as the rule of Glanzer,
but also to foreseen limited classes. The extension is significant when viewed in
the light of the strict94 application of Ultramares and the reluctance to follow
Glanzer prior to Rusch Factors, Inc. It is in the dicta of the most recent deci-
sions that the potentiality for a more extensive liability-possibly to the full limits
of foreseeability-exists.
IV. Development of Attorney's Liability to Third
Parties for Negligence
One of the first attempts, by a third party outside the client-attorney rela-
tionship, to recover damages caused by the attorney's negligence was made before
the United States Supreme Court in Savings Bank v. Ward 5 in 1879. The
plaintiff bank loaned money to the attorney's client relying on the attorney's
examination and certification of title to real estate, supposedly owned by the
client, which was the security for the loan. The attorney in his examination
overlooked a deed which showed that the owner-client had conveyed away the
lot in fee simple. The Court, in sustaining the attorney's defense that there must
be privity of contract between the parties in order to maintain an action for
negligence, observed:
[T]he general rule is that the obligation of the attorney is to his client and
not to a third party, and unless there is something in the circumstances of
this case to take it out of that general rule, it seems clear that the proposition
of the defendant must be sustained. .... 6
90 Id. at 403.
91 It has been argued that is was not even necessary to go this far, because the account-
ant sued the defendant successor corporation for the services rendered. It is claimed this is
a recognition by the accountant of privity with the successor corporation.
92 See also Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App.
1971), where the court in defining the accountant's scope of responsibility stated:
We find and hold that within the scope defined in Restatement, Second, Torts, §
552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966), an accountant may be held liable to third parties
who rely upon financial statements, audits, etc. prepared by the accountant in cases
where the latter fails to exercise ordinary care in the preparation of such statements,
audits, etc., and the third party because of such reliance suffers financial loss of dam-
age. Id. at 880.
93 Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401, 403 (1969).
94 Investment Corporation of Florida v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Ct. App. 1968).
95 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
96 Id. at 200.
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The circumstances mentioned by the Court, i.e., fraud," collusion, or an
inherently dangerous act of negligence,9 s were not present, and accordingly the
Court affirmed the judgement for the attorney.
Sixteen years later, the Supreme Court of California, in Buckley v. Gray,9
was faced with an action to recover for the attorney's negligence in drafting and
executing a will. Because of the attorney's negligence, the plaintiff was deprived
of the portion of the estate which the testator had instructed should be given to
the plaintiff by the will. The court, citing Savings Bank and Winterbottom, re-
affirmed the rule of privity and denied recovery to the plaintiff.
As a result of the decisions in Savings Bank and Buckley v. Gray, the general
rule of non-liability of the attorney to third parties was firmly entrenched and
would not be successfully challenged until 1961, some 66 years later."' The
precedent necessary to challenge the rule of non-liability to third parties was
available long before 1961. Judge Cardozo had lashed out against the privity
doctrine in MacPherson which involved tangible, physical harm, and in 1922, in
Glanzer where the damages were solely intangible and economic. But, similar to
the courts application of Ultramares to public accountants,1"' Cardozo's opinion
in Ultramares overshadowed Glanzer and was treated as denying non-liability to
those third parties not in privity of contract with the attorney performing the
services.
In 1961, the California Supreme Court, in Lucas v. Hamm,"0 2 was faced
with a factual situation similar to that of Buckley v. Gray-i.e., the alleged"0 3
negligence of an attorney in drafting a will resulting in damages to the benefi-
ciaries. The court overruled Buckley v. Gray, relying upon a prior 1958 Califor-
nia Supreme Court decision that had rejected the privity doctrine in a case in-
volving a notary public.' It was recognized by the court that an extension of
the attorney's liability to third parties not in privity was "a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors,"'0 5 one of which is:
[W]hether the recognition of liability to beneficiaries of wills negligently
drawn by attorney would impose an undue burden on the profession. Al-
though in some situations liability could be large and unpredictable in
amount, this is also true of an attorney's liability to his client. We are of
the view that the extension of his liability to beneficiaries injured by a negli-
gently drawn will does not place an undue burden on the profession, parti-
97 See note 32 supra.
98 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
99 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895).
100 Averill, Attorney's Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Malpractice, 2 LA ND &
WATER L. REv. 379, 387 (1967). See Lucas v. Hamm, note 102 intra.
101 Hawkins, supra note 58, at 815; Levitin, supra note 58, at 447.
102 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987(1962). Accord, Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 75 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969);
Licata v. Spector, 26 Conn. Supp. 378, 225 A.2d 28 (1968); contra, Maneriv v. Amodeo,
238 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
103 The court held that the error of the lawyer was not negligently committed; therefore,
what it said as to the scope of the duty was technically dictum. See Averill, Attorney's Liability
to Third Persons for Negligent Malpractice, 2 LAND & WATER L. Rav. 379, 395 n.97 (1967).
104 Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
105 Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 823 (1961).
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
cularly when we take into consideration that a contrary conclusion would
cause the innocent beneficiary to bear the loss ... 106
The court talked in terms of "the foreseeability of harm"'0 7 to the plaintiff.
The Lucas court gives indications that it would extend liability beyond Glanzer
to those situations where the plaintiff is unknown but a member of a class of per-
sons that the attorney knows or should know will be affected-i.e., all benefi-
ciaries under a will, whether named or unnamed, would be able to bring an ac-
tion for the attorney's negligence. The impact of the Lucas decision is not limited
to the area of wills; it will carry over to other services performed by attorneys
where there exists a potential for damages to third parties outside the attorney-
client relationship. Services, such as the drafting of certain types of documents
and the issuance of opinion letters, will fall within the general ambit of Lucas.
That is, if the attorney in performing such services knows or should know that
a third party will be adversely effected by the negligent performance of the ser-
vice, the lack of privity will be no bar to the recovery of economic damages.
The present scope of the attorney's liability for economic damages negligent-
ly caused may be said to embrace the rule of Glanzer""5 and probably the rule of
liability to a member of a known or foreseeable limited class.' 9 It is only from
the vibrations of the assault upon the rationale in Ultramares, which the recent
decisions"' in the accounting profession have created, that carry the potential of
liability to the full limits of foreseeability for negligence in the performance of
legal services.
V. Retention or Abolition of Ultramares?
The extension of the public accountant's and the attorney's liability for
negligence to the full limits of foreseeability will necessarily involve the overrule
of Ultramares. The Ultramares decision is a limitation on recovery of economic
damages, denying liability to the full limits of foreseeability when the damages
are attributable to negligence. Though Ultramares dealt with the accounting
profession, it is clear that the holding and policy considerations thereof are equal-
ly applicable to numerous services performed by attorneys."' Suffice to say any
determination of the status of Ultramares will affect the legal profession.
Most of the arguments, by commentators.. or in court dicta,"' for or
against the retention of Ultramares have been made in the context of inquiry as to
106 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
107 364 P.2d 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
108 Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
109 In M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1961), the court in formulating a rule of the foreseeable limited class, cited as
authority Biakanja and Lucas.
110 Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969); Shatterproof Glass Corporation v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971).
I1l Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931).
112 See note I supra.
113 See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968) Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969). See also Texas Tunneling Company v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn.,




the ultimate effect on the accounting profession if Ultramares was to be overruled.
The welfare of the accounting profession has been the main reason for the exist-
ence of the Ultramares doctrine. The court in Ultramares felt that to extend
liability to all who may foreseeably rely upon certified financial statements would
expose public accountants to potential financial ruin, threatening the existence
of the accounting profession. The reason for a risk of such magnitude is that
the primary service performed by the accounting profession-the expression of an
opinion..4 as to the fairness of presentation of the financial position and results
of operations of the client-is a service which is intended to be utilized and relied
upon by numerous types of third parties. The scope of usage of certified finan-
cial statements is extensive, embracing groups such as banks and lending institu-
tions, present or potential stockholders, purchasers, sellers and suppliers. Because
of the broad usage of the public accountant's opinion (certificate), Ultramares
will be overruled only when the courts are convinced that the arguments and
policy considerations weigh against the "protection" of the accounting profession
and in favor of the third party, who is unknown and not a member of a known
or foreseen limited class but whose reliance on the accountant's certificate is gen-
erally foreseeable. The courts will give only secondary considerations to the effect
of "full foreseeability" on other professions. As a general rule, other professions
do not perform services of a nature that will attract reliance and use by an exten-
sive class or classes of third parties. Extensive third party reliance is inherent in
the basic service performed by public accountants. Therefore, the potential for
unlimited liability, if such a potential exists, must be said to weigh heaviest over
the accounting profession. When the factual circumstances afford a court the
opportunity to follow or overrule Ultramares there are numerous arguments and
policy considerations to be balanced."'
Those who advocate the retention of a rule that would deny recovery to the
full limits of foreseeability where the accountant has negligently misrepresented
the financial affairs of the client would argue that to extend liability for negli-
114 The short-form report of the auditor (also referred to as the auditor's certificate or
opinion) is customarily used in connection with the basic financial statements. It is also often
included as part of a long-form report. The usual short-form report consists of a representa-
tion as to the work performed, expressed in an opening or "scope" paragraph, and a represen-
tation as to the independent auditor's conclusions usually in a closing or "opinion" paragraph.
Because of the weight which the independent auditor's opinion carries with the investing
and lending public and the responsibilities he assumes in expressing it, reasonable uniformity
in the manner of stating the opinion is important both to the auditor and to those who rely on
his findings.
The profession in general has adopted the following short form of independent auditor's
report:
We have examined the balance sheet of X Company as of June 30, 19- and the
related statement (s) of income and retained earnings for the year then ended. Our
examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and
accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing
procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and statement (s) of income and
retained earnings present fairly the financial position of X Company at June 30,
19-, and the results of its operations for the year ended, in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding
year.
STATEMENTS ON AUDITING PROCEDURE No. 33 at 57.
115 The arguments have been continuously made from the Ultramares decision in 1931 to
the present. See note 1 supra, for those recent arguments which take into consideration the
accounting profession's surgence within the last fifteen years.
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gence to the full limits of foreseeability would make negligence coterminous with
fraud"' or collusion, the more flagrant impositions on the rights of others. The
potential liability" 7 could be indefinite because of the extensive use of the certifi-
cate in terms of the number of users and in terms of the dollar value of transac-
tions generated by reliance on the public accountant's certificate. Also, the
potential liability could be out of proportion to the fault, as in Jaillet v. Cash-
man," 8 where the defendant, Dow Jones & Co., had accidentally published on
its tickers that the Supreme Court had decided that stock dividends were taxable
income. The plaintiff, a customer in his broker's office, relying on the ticker re-
port and believing that such a holding would depress the value of his securities,
sold his stock. The defendant corrected its mistake within forty-five minutes, but
the stock market had reacted unfavorably with numerous sales made in reliance
upon the ticker report. The court denied liability for the unintentional mistake
in the report. A mistake, as simple as this could and did affect countless inves-
tors; the same could happen in the accounting profession.
The accounting profession is relatively young and has not had the time to
fully develop exactness in the standards of investigation and in the principles of
presentation. Accordingly, the high degree of disclosure demanded by many of
the critics is not presently obtainable." 9
If liability extended to the full limits of foreseeability, the availability of
accountant's professional liability insurance would be questionable.120  Likewise,
public accountants should not be insurers against corporate mismanagement or
poor investment and credit decisions.
The benefit to society from the numerous audits performed without error
outweighs the benefits to society derived from extension of liability for the infre-
quent audit which may be negligent, an extension which has the potential to fi-
nancially destroy an accounting firm because of one negligent audit.
Those who argue for extension of liability to the full limits of foresecability,
i.e., the overrule of Ultramares, would challenge the premise that the scope of
liability for negligence causing only intangible, economic damages (monetary
loss) should be more limited than the scope of liability for negligence causing
tangible, physical damages (physical injury to person or property)."' One who
116 Note 32 supra.
117 The potential liability can be great as evidenced by the settlement in the Mill Factors
case for $4,950,000. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 24, 1970 at 8.
118 235 N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923).
119 For an extensive discussion on the inability to provide greater disclosure and an argu-
ment that more disclosure is not needed see Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An
Ill-Considered Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. Rnv. 675 (1971).
120 See Weyrich, Exposure to Professional Liability, THE Nnw YoRKs C.P.A. 556-64 (July
1970) where the author, in describing the effect of current litigation on accountants' liability
insurance, states:
In some instances, premium costs have tripled over the past several years, while
self-insurance, or the deductible portion under the policies, has grown over 50 times.
This enormous insurance cost, despite the increasing amount of self-insurance risk
being assumed by the accountants, clearly reflects the insurance underwriters' evalua-
tion of the problem. Moreover, it is becoming apparent that insurance underwriters
are losing interest in this type of coverage - at any price.
See also note 119; Comment, Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered Extension of
the Law, 46 WAsH. L. REv. 675, 682 (1971).
121 See Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co. - Negligent Misrepresentation by
Accountants, 67 L.Q. REv. 466, 478 (1951); New York Title & Mortgage Co. v. Hutton, 71
F.2d 989, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
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invests and loses his life savings as a result of reliance on a negligently certified
financial statement is no different than one who is physically incapacitated by
another's negligence and subsequently compensated for the "life savings" he will
not be able to earn. The rules of negligence should be the same regardless of
the type of damages involved.
Between the innocent reliant party and the negligent public accountant,
the accountant should bear the burden of his negligence."' The reliance placed
upon the public accountant's independent123 and professional opinion, stated in
his "certificate of opinion," as to the fairness of presentation of financial state-
ments has elevated the accountant to the respected position he commands today
in the financial community. Without third party reliance, the value of the ac-
countant's certificate to his client is slight, if any. To maintain this reliance, the
public accountant need only adhere to the standards of the profession, upgrading
professional practices when necessary; and on failing, he should not be heard to
say that there was "over-reliance" upon his certificate. The job of the public
accountant is to ascertain the material facts and present them in a manner that
will not be materially misleading; if he has done so without negligence, there will
be no liability. Even if the public accountant was negligent, the nature of the
accountant's services itself will prevent or limit liability because the plaintiff must
prove reliance-i.e., he would not have loaned or invested but for the account-
ant's certificate.12 4 Also, if the accountant was negligent, but there has in fact
been over-reliance on the certificate and accompanying financial statements, i.e.,
unreasonable reliance, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff will be a bar
to liability. The person allegedly injured, however, should not be prevented
from proving the one thing the public accountant wants-reasonable reliance.
The extension of liability to the full limits of foreseeability will not spell the
end of the accounting profession. If the courts adhere to strict rules of proof
of causation, foreseeability, and reliance, the profession will not face ruin. Situa-
tions such as that in Jaillet v. Cashman-fault out of proportion to liability-are
doubtful. The sophistication of modern auditing procedures and programs and
the pyramid of responsibility and review" 5 make it highly unlikely that a
"thoughtless slip or blunder,""8 a minor mistake, or slight negligence, would gen-
erate catastrophic consequences. Only when the actions of the accountant are
seriously out of line with the accepted professional practices will there be a poten-
122 Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. R.I. 1968).
123 The independence of the public accountant is the basic reason for the success and
growth of the accounting profession. Independence is tied to public reliance upon the accoun-
tant's certificate. Without independence there would be no reliance and consequently no use
for the accountant's service. The public accountant holds himself out to the public as inde-
pendent and non-biased. His status is not that of an advocate, but, rather, approaches the
status of a quasi-public agent. It has been argued that extension of the scope of responsibility
would be consistent with the accountant's claim of independence and with his quasi-public
status.
124 Solomon, supra note 1, at 81.
125 In the bigger accounting firms, on a large audit engagement (size measured on the
basis of hours required to complete) the typical pyramid of responsibility and review is com-
posed of the following groups of individuals: juniors, semi-seniors, seniors, supervisor, manager,
partner, and a report review consisting of partners and managers.
126 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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tiality for large damages.127  The public accountant does not verify and could
not verify the correctness of the financial statements to the penny. Rather,
through statistical sampling techniques, he verifies enough of the financial tran-
sactions to express an opinion. If the accountant is not negligent in the selection
or execution of the chosen sampling techniques, he has a sufficient and mathe-
matically denominated basis to express an opinion on the financial position and
results of operations of the company audited. Negligent selection or execution of
audit sampling techniques cannot be considered minor mistakes.
The increase of risk of liability, if any, could be insured against. Profes-
sional liability insurance will always be available,'28 and additionally, there are
various forms of self-insurance which may be initiated. The accounting profes-
sion could pass the the cost of such insurance to the client."' The client would
accept the increase in cost because the certificate would be of more value to the
client. The certificate would increase in value because of greater reliance and
response placed upon it by the financial community. The result of the extension
of the scope of responsibility would be increased confidence in, and importance
of, the accountant's certificate to the financial community. Increasing the cost
of the service would not reduce the demand for the service. Rather, the increased
cost would appear to be in line with the increased value of the service.
Extending liability to the full limits of foreseeability would elevate the cau-
tionary techniques of the accounting profession. 3 That is, increasing the scope
of liability would force the constant adherence to acceptable professional stand-
ards. Also, an extension of liability would result in upgrading those professional
standards that are not in line with the needs of the financial and business com-
munity. This does not mean the public accountant is to be a guarantor of
financial success. Likewise, the accountant is not a guarantor of total accuracy
of the financial statements. Rather, the full foreseeability rule would tend to
make the accountant conscious not only of his professional obligation to third
parties, but also of his legal obligation. This "consciousness" would be a major
factor in the successful performance of professional services and the consequential
avoidance of liability.
It is in the recent decisions that the criticism of Ultramares has been accepted
and the stronghold of Ultramares loosened.'' These decisions, in rejecting or
disapproving the Ultramares policy considerations, have extended the account-
ant's scope of liability as far as the known limited or foreseeable class. The deci-
sions give indications that the courts may go further in the not too distant future.
Even if extension of liability to the full limits of foreseeability is not in the
contemplation of the courts when they determine that members of foreseen or
127 See Meek, Liability of the Accountant to Parties Other than His Employer for Negli-
gent Misrepresentation, 1942 Wis. L. REv. 371, 389.
128 The cogency of this argument presents a close question which ultimately will be decided
by the insurance market. However, partners in two of the leading international public account-
ing firms did not foresee the unavailability of insurance in the future even if the present legal
climate was to continue. Letters from international public accounting firms on file with the
Notre Dame Lawyer.
129 Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D. R.I. 1968).
130 Id. at 91.
131 Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968); Ryan v. Kanne, 170
N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
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known limited classes may recover, it has been argued that liability must be ex-
tended to the "full limits" and not just to a known limited or foreseeable class.
The rationale being, the known or foreseen limited class will likely be made up
of powerful and sophisticated institutions such as lenders and businesses. These
institutions, through their legal counsel and personnel, will make their reliance
foreseen to the public accountant, while the less sophisticated and less powerful
individual or institution, not a member of a limited class that has made its reli-
ance foreseeable, will be denied recovery. The sophisticated lender or business
creditor, if a member of a foreseen limited class, will be granted yet another pref-
erential status to the exclusion of individuals such as investors.132
The certified financial statements are relied upon by various classes of insti-
tutions and individuals comprising the financial and business community. Yet,
recovery would only be allowed to foreseen limited classes and not to those fore-
seeable classes that fail to meet the nebulous requirements of the "foreseen limited
class." From the viewpoint of the entire financial and business community, this
rule, allowing recovery to certain classes to the exclusion of others, would produce
unacceptable results.
A criterion which allows a powerful lending institution to recover solely be-
cause it is a member of a limited class that was foreseen, is a questionable policy.
Rather, it would appear that the only acceptable and equitable solution is to
extend liability to the full limits of foreseeability.
VI. Erosion and Overrule of Ultramares-Effect
on the Legal Profession
The extension of liability to foreseen limited classes or eventually to the full
limits of foreseeability for negligence causing economic damages will obviously
effect the legal profession as well as other professions. This does not mean, how-
ever, that every type of professional service performed by the attorney will fall
within the scope of potential liability to third parties. When the attorney can
reasonably expect reliance by a third party upon the service performed, or rea-
sonably should know that the consequences of the negligent performance of his
services might affect directly and materially the interests of a third party, only
then would the service be said to be of such a nature as to fall within the scope of
potential liability to third parties.
The examination of legal services that will fall within the scope of potential
liability to third parties is a matter best left to "plaintiffs' attorneys." However,
there is one area worthy of note-opinion letters.
It is in the issuance of opinion letters that the functions of lawyers and ac-
countants are most analogous. If and when Ultramares falls, the resultant con-
sequences to lawyers is no better stated than by Judge Cardozo in Ultramares
when he observed:
Liability for negligence if adjudged in this case will extend to many
callings other than an auditor's. Lawyers who certify their opinion as to
132 There are other legal means of granting preferential status to the creditors to the exclu-
sion of investors, i.e., bankruptcy laws.
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the validity of municipal or corporate bonds, with knowledge that the opin-
ion will be brought to the notice of the public, will become liable to the
investors, if they have overlooked a statute or decision, to the same extent
as if the controversy were one between client and adviser. 33
Similarly, in a factual circumstance like that of Savings Bank,3' where the
attorney issued an opinion as to the status of the title to real estate, if it is to be
reasonably expected that the client would use the opinion to induce some type of
third party reliance or action, i.e., granting a loan secured by the real estate, then
the attorney must answer for his negligence.
In recent years, a survey was made of various law firms asking assorted
questions on the issuance of opinions and the responsibilities therewith.' 5 The
author in summarizing the results of the survey stated:
The frank assertion is that lawyers, as a group, do not as a rule expect to
be held strictly accountable for their written advice.'36
The author concluded with the warning:
For those who feel that the whole idea of an attorney being held responsible
for less-than-adequate advice or complete failure of advice is unworthy of
serious concern, the time is fast approaching when these heads had better
come out of the sand. 37
The current value of this survey made four years ago may be questioned. How-
ever, the warning issued is presently valid. The potential liability in the area
of opinion letters could be extensive. Obviously, it is not a matter to be taken
lightly by the legal profession.
VII. Conclusion
The strict interpretation and application of Ultramares, i.e., no liability to
third parties for negligence, has given way to a rule that will allow members of
foreseen limited classes to recover for negligent misrepresentations by the public
accountant. The application of a rule of "foreseen limited classes" will lead to
judicial confusion and inconsistency in addition to inequitable results. Accord-
ingly, the scope of the accountant's responsibility for negligent misrepresentation
should be extended to the full limits of foreseeability, i.e., liability to those indivi-
duals or institutions whose reliance was reasonably foreseeable.
An extension of the accountant's liability to "full foreseeability" will, as
Judge Cardozo observed, affect "many callings other than an auditor's,' 1 38 the
legal profession being no exception. At the present time the scope of the attor-
133 Ultranares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 188, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931).
134 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
135 Corso, Opinions of Counsel: Responsibilities and Liabilities, 17 CLEVE.-MAR. L. REV.
375 (1968).
136 Id. at 375.
137 Id. at 387.
138 Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 188, 174 N.E. 441, 448 (1931).
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ney's responsibility to third parties for negligence is limited. However, n light of
the expansion of liability in the analogous profession of public accounting and
the eventual recognition of parity of intangible, economic damages with tangible,
physical damages, the attorney's third party liability should and will be extended
to the full limits of foreseeability.
Society accords public accountants and attorneys their status as profes-
sionals. To retain this "professional status," the accounting and legal professions
must maintain the public's confidence and trust. Indirectly, this will be accom-
plished by accepting responsibility for conduct that falls below professional stand-
ards and injures third persons outside the client-professional relationship. This
does not mean that public trust and confidence will be maintained as long as
there is a pocket from which to collect. Rather, the recovery of damages is only
a secondary objective of increasing the scope of professional responsibility. The
prime objective would be to create "active" awareness or consciousness of the
professional obligations owed to society and particularly to that segment or com-
munity of society that will rely upon the services of the professional.
It must be recognized, however, that there will always be those who fail to
conform to professional standards of skill and knowledge. Nevertheless, the time
has come for shifting the burden of loss from the innocent reliant third party to
the negligent professional. Increasing professional responsibility will not destroy
the accounting and legal professions. Rather, increasing professional responsi-
bility will maintain the public confidence and trust and thereby solidify the exist-
ence of the accounting and legal professions.
Richard L. Miller
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